Abstract: The user cost of non-interest bearing currency is the nominal interest rate. Increases in inflation lead to decreased real currency held in steady state, which imposes a welfare cost. Lucas (2000) estimates this welfare cost in a model with a single non-interest bearing monetary asset. Lucas suggests applying monetary aggregation/index number theory to generalize the model to contain interest-bearing deposits. We solve a general equilibrium model with three agents: a household, a goods producing firm, and a financial firm. We assume that currency and deposits provide utility to the household and form a weakly separable group in the utility function. We use monetary aggregation and index number methods to calibrate the model and estimate the welfare cost of inflation. We compare these estimates to welfare cost estimates from a model in which all money is non-interest bearing currency. We find that the welfare cost of inflation is substantially lower in the models with interest-bearing deposits than in models with only non-interest bearing currency. We also find that the welfare cost of inflation is positively related to the own price elasticity of aggregate money demand.
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The user cost of non-interest bearing monetary assets is the nominal interest rate. An increase in the rate of inflation will cause the nominal rate of interest to increase and therefore makes non-interest bearing assets less attractive relative to interest-bearing assets, consumer goods, and leisure. The attempt to substitute away from non-interest bearing monetary assets in response to inflation will cause the price level to rise and the real stocks of the assets to fall. This is the basic idea underlying a long line of research on the welfare cost of inflation, recently surveyed and updated in Lucas (2000) . Lucas (2000) solves for the steady state in a general equilibrium money-in-the-utility function model. In his model, steady state consumption is invariant to the rate of inflation and the real stock of non-interest bearing money in steady state (and hence the steady state instantaneous utility) is inversely related to the rate of inflation. The welfare cost of inflation can be estimated as the increase in steady state consumption necessary to offset the loss of utility caused by inflation, or by the closely related concept of equivalent variations. 1 Other recent studies that address the welfare cost of inflation in different types of models are Gillman (1993), Dotsey and Ireland (1996) , and Simonsen and Cysne (2001) .
Lucas (2000) focuses on the M1 level of monetary aggregation and assumes that all components of M1 are non-interest bearing. He suggests that interest-bearing assets could be introduced into the model by applying monetary aggregation theory to measure the aggregate quantity of money as a superlative quantity index, following Barnett (1978 Barnett ( ,1980 Barnett ( , 1987 . The user cost of interest-bearing monetary assets is not the nominal interest rate, but rather the interest rate differential between the rate on an alternative non-monetary asset and the own rate on the interest-bearing asset. The percentage change in a superlative Divisia monetary quantity index is the sum of the expenditure share weighted percentage changes in the component quantities of the index. M1 has contained explicit interest-bearing components since the mid1970s, and almost all of the economists that have constructed superlative quantity index numbers at the M1 level have assumed that non-interest bearing demand deposits earn implicit interest.
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The additional assets in broader monetary aggregates such as M2 and M3 are all interest bearing.
Modifying the standard money-in-the-utility function model to incorporate interest-bearing deposits leads to several complications. First, the own price elasticity of the "money demand function" could be quite different for superlative monetary indexes than for traditional aggregates such as M1 and M2. This is quite significant to estimates of the welfare cost of inflation, which are closely approximated by the area under the inverse money demand function. Second, the model needs to describe both the supply and demand for interest-bearing assets in general equilibrium and to connect the steady state inflation rate to the steady state user cost of deposits.
We introduce monetary aggregation theory into the basic money-in-the-utility function model of Lucas (2000) . In our model, households supply labor and derive utility from consumer goods, currency, and a good we call financial services. A government creates non-interest bearing currency and the two types of goods are produced by profit maximizing firms. The supply of financial services is based on the model of King and Plosser (1984) . We establish the equivalence between financial services and interest-bearing deposits, and calibrate our model under the assumption that currency and interest-bearing deposits are weakly separable from consumer goods in the household's utility function. 3 We use superlative monetary quantity indexes in our calibration of the model.
We find that the estimated welfare cost of inflation is much lower than would have been found if we had assumed that all monetary assets are non-interest bearing. The economic logic of this result is straightforward. The expenditure share on non-interest bearing currency is very low relative to the expenditure share on interest-bearing deposits (particularly for broad levels of aggregation) and the steady state user cost of interest-bearing deposits is invariant to the steady state rate of inflation. 4 Thus, an increase in the rate of inflation will have a smaller effect on the aggregate price of money than it would have had if all money were non-interest bearing and consequently there will be smaller welfare losses.
In Section I, we describe the model; in Section II, we calibrate the model and compute the welfare cost of inflation; in Section III, we outline possible extensions of the model followed by a brief conclusion.
I. Money-in-the-Utility Function Model
We set up a general equilibrium model, which is a generalization of the money in the utility function model in Lucas (2000) . The model has a utility maximizing representative household and two profit maximizing representative firms. Households derive utility from the real stock of currency and the quantities of consumer goods and financial services. One firm produces consumer goods and the other firm produces financial services. The prices of currency, consumer goods, and financial services are determined by market clearing conditions. 
w s is the real wage in sector i (i =1,2) all at instant s. 5 We assume that the rate of population growth is zero for simplicity.
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The household owns all of the capital stock of the economy and rents it to the two firms at the rental price, ( ( ) ) r s δ + . The household may also supply labor to either of the two sectors.
We assume that households inelasticly supply one unit of labor, which can be divided between both sectors so that 1 2 1 n n + = . If the wages are not equal in the two sectors then households will allocate all labor to the sector with the higher wage. Therefore, interior solutions require that the wages be equal in both sectors. We can define total labor income as ( ) 
The and substitute into the flow budget constraint to produce (1).
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Assuming V is differentiable and quasi-concave and the solution is interior, the solution to the optimal control problem can be derived from the following conditions: The first three conditions are the intra-temporal optimality conditions, which imply that the marginal rates of substitution between pairs of goods equal the corresponding relative price ratios. The fourth condition is the inter-temporal optimality condition, and the final condition is transversality. The variable µ is the costate variable for the current-value Hamiltonian.
Profit Maximizing Goods Producers:
Goods producing firms hire labor and rent capital to maximize instantaneous profits. Let 1 ( ) n s denote the labor hired in the goods producing sector, and 1 ( ) k s be capital rented by the goods producing firm at instant s. Goods are produced from the production function
. The firm maximizes instantaneous profits:
( )
The necessary conditions for optimality are as follows:
The instantaneous profits from the goods producing sector are paid to the household sector as income 1 ( ) s θ . We assume that 1 λ is constant for simplicity.
Profit Maximizing Financial Service Producers:
The financial service producing firm hires labor, 2 ( ) n s , and rents capital, 2 ( ) k s , to produce financial services. We assume labor and capital are transformed into financial services by the production function:
. This is the approach taken by King and Plosser (1984) . The firm maximizes instantaneous profits:
The instantaneous profits from the goods producing sector are paid to the household sector as
We assume that 2 λ is constant for simplicity.
We consider some possible generalizations of this model in Section III. In particular, we comment on the possible implications of required reserves and excess reserves.
General Equilibrium Conditions in Steady State:
The optimality conditions imply that
, and by definition, the growth rate of real currency is (
Thus, the following additional conditions hold in steady state:
If 1 2 , 0 n n ≠ then the wage in the two sectors must be equal. The conditions for profit maximization and wage equalization in steady state yield the conditions:
The aggregate resource constraints for the two types of goods and labor supply in steady state yield the conditions:
We assume that both production functions, f and h, are homogeneous of degree one in capital and labor. This allows us to rewrite the steady state conditions in terms of the ratio of capital to labor,
The profits from both sectors will be zero in equilibrium because f and h are homogeneous of degree one in capital and labor.
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The remaining household optimality conditions evaluated in steady state are as follows:
Equations ( (7) - (11) (1, )
In appendix A.1, we show that 0 A < if c, d, and m are all normal goods.
We can provide an economic interpretation of equation (12). Equations (8) and (10) imply that
in steady state, meaning that the marginal rate of substitution between the consumption good and financial services equals the relative price ratio. If we assume that 
< , and * / 0 m σ ∂ ∂ < . Thus, an increase in the user cost of currency, which is caused by an increase in inflation, will cause real demand for currency to decrease in steady state. A formal result can be obtained if we assume that currency and financial services are weakly separable from consumption goods. Suppose there exists a sub-utility function, g, such that the instantaneous utility function can be written as ( , , )
If the category sub-utility function, g, is homothetic then it is an aggregator function and two stage budgeting theory is available under certain regularity conditions. If U is quasi-convex in c and g, and c and g are both normal goods then * / 0 m σ ∂ ∂ < . We provide a formal proof and interpretation in appendix A.2.
We can also provide an economic interpretation of equation (13 
II. The Welfare Cost of Inflation
Lucas (2000) (1, ) ( ) f z λ φ δ ⋅ = + . In this case, steady state consumption is invariant to σ , and the real stock of currency in steady state is determined by the equation:
The welfare cost of inflation can be measured by determining the proportion by which steady state consumption would have to increase to offset the loss in utility caused by inflation, relative to some benchmark level of inflation, 
The optimum rate of inflation is given by the Friedman rule, 
In order to compute ( , )
B λ σ σ , we need to choose parametric functions for the utility and production functions and calibrate the values of the parameters.
A preferred concept of welfare cost, in terms of microeconomics, would be the concept of equivalent variations, EV. The definition of EV in this context equals
EV is the minimum increase in real consumer expenditure on both goods and money at actual relative prices such that indirect utility is increased from ( )
U c g σ σ , and it follows from the definition that Functional Forms:
We assume that currency and financial services are homotheticly weakly separable from consumer goods, so that ( , , )
, where g is a linearly homogeneous subutility function. 11 Homothetic weak separability implies that g evaluated at the optimum is a quantity aggregate. If financial services are bank deposits, then it is a monetary quantity aggregate. The dual price of this quantity aggregate is the unit expenditure function:
We assume that the quantity aggregate is CES:
where 1 b < , and non-zero. The dual price aggregate has a dual CES form: Two stage budgeting theory is applicable under this assumption. The household can be viewed as a making a two-stage decision. 12 In the first stage, the household maximizes lifetime utility: 
Under our assumptions, the two-stage decision will have the same optimal solution as the original decision for all variables.
Assumptions about U will determine the relationship between c and g on the optimal path. 13 Following Lucas (2000), we assume that U has a CRRA form: 
We also assume that production in both sectors is Cobb-Douglass. The production functions have the form: In order to use the model to produce an estimate of ( , ) We set ψ and b equal to the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of a homothetic CES second-stage demand system. The second-stage decision that generates the CES demand system does not depend on other parameters of the model, because of homothetic weak separability. The share equations for the demand system are as follows:
We estimate ψ and b by maximum likelihood. We assumed that the true expenditure shares were generated by , The problem with this method is that the residual of the regression equation has very significant serial correlation and the variables appear to contain unit roots. We could treat η as the coefficient in a co-integration relation between ln( / ) g c and ln( ) g ρ , but we were unable to find any evidence to support co-integration for our data. The serial correlation leads to large sustained errors during certain periods, particularly the 1990's. 25 An alternative approach is to employ the concept of a long run derivative. The optimal control relation in equation (17) 
from Fisher and Seater (1993) . 26 We set the lag length using the AI criterion. The LRD is an estimate of η − . The residuals from (19) are not unusual in the 1990's and the LRD is reasonably robust to the sample period. The parameter 2 λ , which determines the units of financial services, is calibrated so that the steady state expenditure share of currency equals its average value during 1959-2000. 28 The remaining parameter β is set to equal α .
We can also calibrate the model under the special case that all money is non-interest bearing currency. The special case is achieved by setting 2 λ = 0, and 0 ψ = . The steady state values for the model are then The calibrated parameter values that are the same for all cases are given in Table 1A , the calibrated parameter values that change for each case are given in Table 1B . The steady state solutions are given in Table 2 for all cases.
Welfare Cost Estimates:
We solve for the welfare cost measure ( , ) σ σ ∈ using a numerical procedure. 30 We give some representative values for 100 ( , ) Table 3 , but the results are easier to understand graphically. We therefore provide graphs of the welfare cost estimates.
Graph1 contains estimates at the M1a level, Graph 2 at the MZM level, and Graph 3 at the M2 level. We also estimated the equivalent variation measure of welfare cost described above and found that the differences were not numerically important.
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Main Conclusions:
Several main conclusions are evident:
i) The welfare cost of inflation in the generalized model is very low when compared with the estimates in Lucas (2000) , which closely resemble case 13. In that case, we found that the benefit from reducing the steady state rate of inflation from 20% to -5% would be equivalent to an increase in steady state consumption of almost 2.5%. The estimates from cases 1-6 provide much more modest estimates, the increase in steady state consumption range from as low as .207% to as high as .59%.
ii) The welfare cost of inflation is always much lower in the models with non-interest bearing currency and interest bearing deposits than in the models with only non-interest bearing currency. We investigated a variety of different cases corresponding to different levels of aggregation and different methods for calibrating the crucial parameter η . Cases 1-6 correspond to the generalized model and these are paired with cases 7-12 in which only non-interest bearing currency is held. The welfare cost of inflation is much less in all cases for the models in which interest-bearing deposits can be held versus the models with only non-interest bearing currency.
The basic reason is that the larger the expenditure share of interest bearing deposits versus noninterest bearing currency the less the aggregate price of money g ρ increases in response to an increase in inflation. 32 The smaller the effect of σ on g ρ the weaker the desire to substitute away from aggregate money (in other words, the weaker the effect on * * / g c ) and consequently the lower the welfare cost of inflation. For our calibrations, the effect of increases in σ on steady state consumption, * c , are positive but very small.
iii)
The welfare cost of inflation is positively related to the elasticity of the aggregate money demand relation, η , which can be seen by comparing cases 1-3 to cases 4-6. The logic behind this is that the higher the value of η , the more * * / g c will need to adjust in response to a given change in σ .
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In our opinion, cases 4-6 produce more plausible estimates, because of econometric considerations. The linear regression that is used to produce estimates of the own price elasticity of money demand in cases 1-3 suffers from serial correlation problems, whereas the LRD that is used in cases 4-6 is based on an estimated autoregression. Nevertheless, our basic conclusion that the welfare cost of inflation is quite low is robust to the range of estimates in cases 1-6.
III. Extensions of the Model
The model presented in this paper can be enriched in several ways. First, we have assumed that all deposits (including demand deposits) are interest bearing. We could generalize this by allowing the banking system to produce multiple deposit types, some of which are noninterest bearing. This would be expected to raise the estimate of the welfare cost of inflation, because it would raise the expenditure share on the non-interest bearing monetary components.
Nevertheless, all types of deposits in conventional monetary aggregates are interest bearing except for demand deposits and there is substantial empirical evidence that the implicit rate of interest on demand deposits is positive.
Second, we have assumed that all interest-bearing deposits are weakly separable from non-interest bearing currency. We could generalize the model to include deposits that are not weakly separable. The cost of doing this is that it could reduce the precision of our calibration by adding numerous additional preference and technology parameters. We could also test explicitly for weakly separable groupings of deposits using available econometric techniques. 34 Third, we could consider more general specifications of the optimal control relationship between the aggregate quantity of money, the aggregate price of money, and real consumption.
We considered the class of utility functions that produce "money demand functions" that exhibit unit consumption elasticity, which does not seem to be strongly supported by the data. We could generalize the model to allow the consumption elasticity to differ from one. Fourth, we could calibrate an extended version of either the shopping time or cash-inadvance models. The shopping time model has the advantage that the welfare cost of inflation is clearly defined in terms of lost production due to time spent shopping. If the rate of inflation increases, the household will spend more time shopping to economize on non-interest bearing currency. We expect that the basic finding of this paper will remain valid. The existence of interest-bearing assets that reduce shopping time will lead to substantially lower estimates of the cost of inflation.
Finally, we could enrich the supply side of the model to include multiple inputs and outputs and reserves, following work such as Hancock (1985 Hancock ( ,1986 , Barnett (1987) , and Fixler and Zieschang (1999) . If financial services producing firms must hold required reserves then the rate of inflation will enter the profit function for those firms. Suppose that each unit of deposits must be backed by x units of required reserves, where 0< x <1. Each unit of required reserves impose a tax equal to the user cost of currency, so that the profit function becomes:
The supply price of deposits, ( )
by an inflation tax. 35 In our model, wages and user costs of capital are equalized across sectors.
This would imply that
S d ρ will be invariant to σ in steady state, but the demand price will
Thus, the user cost of interest-bearing deposits will be less sensitive to inflation than the user cost of non-interest bearing currency, but it will not be invariant to inflation in steady state. This implies that a model with required reserves should lead to higher estimates of the welfare cost of inflation than those presented here, though it will still be substantially lower than in a model with only non-interest bearing currency.
Nevertheless, different types of deposits are subject to different required reserve rates and this will complicate the calibration and solution of the model, and will limit the usefulness of the aggregation-theoretic techniques we have made extensive use of in this paper. A more general possibility would be to incorporate excess reserves as a factor of production. This would be a much richer model, because the optimal level of labor and capital in the financial services sector would both be dependent on the level of inflation, but it is difficult to predict how this might alter our conclusions about the welfare cost of inflation.
Conclusions
We have generalized a standard money-in-the-utility function model to include both currency and interest bearing deposits. We calibrated the model for different levels of monetary aggregation using superlative monetary index numbers and estimate the welfare cost of inflation.
We found that the expenditure share of non-interest bearing currency is relatively low compared to the expenditure share on interest-bearing deposits, and this implies that the welfare cost of inflation is substantially lower in this generalized model than in models in which money consists of only non-interest bearing currency. If we assume that MZM consists entirely of non-interest bearing currency and use a regression based estimate of the own price elasticity of money demand then the estimated benefit of lowering the rate of inflation from 20% to -5% would be equivalent to an increase in steady state consumption of almost 1.8% (using estimates based on the LRD). If we assume that MZM consists of both non-interest bearing currency and interest-bearing deposits and use our generalized model then the estimated benefit of lowering the rate of inflation from 20% to -5% would be equivalent to an increase in steady state consumption of only .261%, which is very small.
The intuition for our result is that if only a small portion of the monetary portfolio is composed of non-interest bearing assets then an increase in the rate of inflation has a small effect on the aggregate price of money and therefore leads to comparatively small estimates of the welfare cost. If our estimates are believed, then this channel by which inflation leads to welfare loss is insignificant and the resources spent fighting inflation must be justified in some alternative way. (1, ) This normal goods assumption implies that 0 A < .
A.2 The derivative of steady state real money demand with respect to inflation
In the text of the paper, we showed that derivative of real currency in steady state with respect to the steady state inflation rate was given by the following: (1, ) (1, )
Now suppose that m and d are weakly separable in the utility function:
Weak separability implies that (1, )
(1, )
Consider the following static microeconomic decision:
max ( 
These conditions and 22 g < 0 imply that Lucas (2000) finds that the estimated welfare cost of inflation is numerically close to the area under the inverse money demand function, which establishes the connection to the classic literature going back to Bailey (1956) . 2 See for examples, Barnett and Spindt (1982) , Farr and Johnson (1985) , Thornton and Yue (1992) , and Anderson, Jones, and Nesmith (1997) . See also, Barro and Santomero (1972) , Klein (1975) , Becker (1975) , and Startz (1979) . The Startz (1979) approach is the one taken by the most widely available data produced by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and described in Anderson, Jones, and Nesmith (1997) . 3 Lucas (2000) also calculated the welfare cost of inflation in a shopping time model, with only non-interest bearing money. Simonsen and Cysne (2001) extend a shopping time model to include both currency and interest-bearing deposits in a shopping time model. They derive upper and lower bounds for the welfare cost of inflation assuming that the interest rate on deposits is invariant to inflation. The bound results have been extended under weak separability to allow the interest rate on deposits to vary with inflation. Simonsen and Cysne (2001) do not calibrate the model or provide estimates of the welfare cost. 4 We assume that demand deposits are implicitly interest bearing. If we instead assumed that these were non-interest bearing we would need to modify our model significantly, and it would lead to increased estimates of the welfare cost of inflation. We can therefore think of our results as being conservative estimates of the welfare cost of inflation and compare and contrast them with the much higher estimates provided by Lucas (2000) . 5 The variable, r, can be thought of as either the real interest rate or the user cost of capital net of depreciation. 6 The nominal user cost of capital is ( ) M1a is defined as currency, traveler's checks, and demand deposits. The data we are using is based on the assumption that demand deposits earn implicit interest. MZM contains all components of M2 except small denomination time deposits. 23 We also note that for two good demand systems the CES utility function is a flexible functional form. 24 Superlative quantity and price index numbers for M1a, MZM, and M2 are available online from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. We created a superlative quantity index for the non-durable and service components of PCE. 25 Lucas (2000) also notes this in his regressions. 26 The data appear to be I(1). The form of LRD depends on the order of integration. 
